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Abstract
The Internal Security Act (ISA) of Singapore has been transformed from a se-
curity law into an effective political instrument of the Singapore government. 
Although the government's use of the ISA for political purposes elicited negative 
reactions from the public, it was not prepared to abolish, or make amendments 
to the Act. In the wake of September 11 and the international campaign against 
terrorism, the opportunity to (re)legitimize the government's use of the ISA 
emerged. This paper argues that despite the ISA's seeming importance in the 
ﬁght against terrorism, the absence of explicit deﬁnitions of national security 
threats, either in the Act itself, or in accompanying legislation, renders the ISA 
susceptible to political misuse. 
Keywords: Internal Security Act, War on Terrorism. People's Action Party, Jemaah 
Islamiyah.
Introduction
In 2001/2002, the Singapore government arrested and detained several 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) operatives under the Internal Security Act (ISA) 
for engaging in terrorist activities. It was alleged that the detained 
operatives were planning to attack local and foreign targets in Singa-
pore. The arrests outraged human rights groups, as the operation was 
reminiscent of the government's crackdown on several alleged Marxist 
conspirators in1987. Human rights advocates were concerned that the 
current detainees would be dissuaded from seeking legal counsel and 
subjected to ill treatment during their period of incarceration (Tang 1989: 
4-7; Frank et al. 1991: 5-99). Despite these protests, many Singaporeans 
expressed their strong support for the government's actions. This latter 
view contrasted sharply with the negative public reaction toward the 
1987 arrests, which stemmed from the belief that the government had 
misused the ISA (Hor 2002: 30-31; Tan 2002). Following the 1987 arrests, 
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the ISA was widely perceived as an instrument of the People's Action 
Party (PAP) regime to curtail dissent, rather than as an instrument to 
protect Singapore from security threats. 
In the 'new security environment' that followed the September 11 at-
tacks, many Western democracies have rushed to enact or fortify national 
security legislation. The features common in such anti-terrorism laws 
included: (i) a concentration and expansion of power in the executive 
arm of government; (ii) an erosion of political and civil liberties; (iii) a 
weakening of judicial procedures; and (iv) a focus on pre-emptive action 
against suspected terrorists (Barker 2003: 556; Hocking 2003: 355). For 
instance, under Section 412 of the USA Patriot Act, a non-US citizen may 
be detained if the attorney general has 'reasonable grounds to believe' 
that the suspect is or has been involved in terrorist activity.1 A person, 
who is deﬁned as a terrorist in Section 411 of the Act, is subject to in-
deﬁnite detention regardless of whether he/she has in fact committed 
an act of terrorism or engaged in terrorist activity.2 The attorney general 
is not compelled to provide the detainee with evidence supporting 
his/her detention or to grant an opportunity for the detainee to contest 
the evidence through administrative review procedures. The detainee's 
only recourse is to submit a writ of habeas corpus3 to the Supreme Court, 
a federal district court or the Court of Appeals, to seek his/her release 
from detention.4 
Such draconian prescriptions have made global anti-terrorism legisla-
tion strikingly akin to the Internal Security Act of Singapore. Countries 
that had in the past been overtly critical of the ISA were now enacting 
similar legislation in their own jurisdictions. This prompted a Singapore 
commentator to remark: 'Has the rest of the world come to appreciate 
Singapore's position?' (Hor 2002: 31). The ironic turn of events has not 
prevented critics of Singapore's ISA from asserting that the Singapore 
government's use of the Act is still dictated by political considerations 
rather than security concerns. In the opinion of Geoffrey Robertson, an 
international human rights lawyer, the Singapore government is ob-
sessed with 'prosecuting liberals instead of worrying about the people 
who are running unlawful arms and explosive shipments which would 
cost hundreds of lives in the region'.5 The Singapore government has 
defended its actions, arguing that:
We are not obsessed with crushing dissidents. You can disagree with us. 
We will accept the arguments. But when somebody poses a threat to our 
security, we take very stern action against them and when you're dealing 
with terrorists, it takes a long time. It requires intelligence networks, to 
30 ___________________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 23•2006
Damien Cheong  ____________________________________________________________
co-operate with one another, to know who they are and then you have just 
got to arrest them to prevent a bomb from going off. You can't work like 
the police – let the bomb go off ﬁrst and then you catch them and put them 
on trial … The Internal Security Act has not been used against the liberals. 
I mean, you have so many of them running around in Singapore. They are 
free to air their views. They are not persecuted.6 
As controversy perpetually surrounds the Singapore government's 
use of the ISA, even in the new security environment, an examination 
of the reasons behind this phenomenon seems warranted. This paper 
will provide an analysis of the politicization of the ISA in Singapore. It 
will trace the evolution of the Act from a colonial security law into an 
instrument of political control. It will also examine the recent attempts 
by the Singapore government to recast the ISA as anti-terrorism legisla-
tion, with the intention of emphasizing the ISA's function as an effective 
defence against security and not political threats. I argue that despite the 
ISA's utility in the ﬁght against terrorist threats, the absence of explicit 
deﬁnitions of national security threats, either in the Act itself or in accom-
panying legislation, does make the ISA susceptible to political misuse. 
National Security and the ISA 
The inherent difﬁculties in conducting research on the ISA have resulted 
in a dearth of academic literature pertaining to the subject. Although the 
Act is part of the Singapore statutes, its extraordinary status, as granted 
by the Singapore Constitution, places it beyond the responsibility of the 
judiciary. Researchers from the ﬁeld of legal studies pioneered attempts 
to conduct comprehensive studies on the ISA (Rawlings 1983: 324-50; 
Tan 1987: 237-53; Yee et al. 1989: 66-103). Such studies were concerned 
mainly with the effectiveness of judicial review, which, prior to 1989, 
was the main legislative recourse for a person detained under the ISA. 
Until the late 1980s, there were no published accounts or reports of a 
detainee's treatment while incarcerated under the ISA. Following the 
1987 arrests, several former detainees began speaking publicly about 
their experiences during preventive detention (Tang 1989: 4-7). Such 
accounts became the basis of investigative reports by international 
human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, which aimed 
to expose the absence of safeguards that resulted in the ill-treatment 
of ISA detainees (Amnesty International 1988: 1-15; Frank et al. 1991: 
5-99). In addition to such reports, Francis Seow's To Catch a Tartar pro-
vides a ﬁrst-hand account of the former solicitor-general's incarceration 
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under the ISA (Seow 1994). These published accounts of ill-treatment 
intimidated many Singaporeans, and this has invariably affected their 
societal and political behaviour. As a result, contemporary research on 
the ISA has not been carried out independently from studies that relate 
to Singapore politics and/or society (Rodan 1996: 95-127; Tay 2000: 170-
89; Chua 2004: 78-101).  
Singapore's National Security Paradigm
A brief examination of the city-state's national security paradigm is a 
useful starting point in the analysis of the Singapore government's use 
of the ISA. Economic sustainability is a major component of Singapore's 
national security paradigm. This is because Singapore's survival as a 
nation-state and the political survival of the PAP regime are both highly 
dependent upon the economy. Singapore's small stature, geographical 
location and lack of natural resources have made it overly reliant on 
international trade including basic necessities, such as food and water 
(Tan 2004: 67). The city-state is therefore extremely sensitive to inter-
nal and external conditions that might adversely affect its trade and 
economy. For this reason, 'Singapore was quick to embrace export-led 
industrialization and a pro-West, pro-capitalist orientation' following 
its independence from Malaysia in 1965 (Tan 2004: 67). As part of its 
plans to minimize potential threats to its economy from external ele-
ments, Singapore sought trade alliances with regional and international 
partners in the 1970s and 1980s. It was envisaged that if Singapore es-
tablished strong trade links with regional and international players, the 
city-state's trading partners would have a vested interest in ensuring that 
she continued to prosper (Da Cunha 2002: 136). Such economic policies 
proved successful, as Singapore was transformed by the 1990s into an 
economic powerhouse that rivalled Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan.
The PAP has a vested interest in maintaining Singapore's economic 
vibrancy. Low unemployment rates, positive growth rates and a general 
prosperity have been the key performance indicators used by the PAP 
to demonstrate its competence in governing the city-state. The PAP's 
impeccable performance on economic matters has been one of the main 
reasons for its continued re-election into power (Perry et al. 1997: 71). As 
such, a failure to produce economic beneﬁts would have a negative effect 
on its political legitimacy. In view of this, the Singapore government has 
adopted certain domestic policies that are designed to maintain Singa-
pore's attractiveness to foreign investors. The government believes that 
social and political stability facilitate a sound commercial sector, which 
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in turn forms the bedrock of Singapore's continued economic growth. 
It has thus enacted a set of laws to regulate business, state and societal 
relationships such that threats to the domestic social and political order 
can be minimized (Ganesan 1998: 588).
The Rule of Law 
There appears to be a contradiction in the way the Singapore government 
applies the Rule of Law (ROL) to the commercial and non-commercial 
sectors.7 While Singapore's ROL has gained international accolades for 
its ability to attract foreign investment and stimulate trade, it has also 
been criticized as unduly harsh toward political dissent, crime and 
other social misdemeanours. As local constitutional lawyer Kevin Tan 
observes:
What human rights groups and international non-governmental organiza-
tions criticize is our [Singapore's] public law record, meaning things such 
as constitutional law, criminal law, anything involving the state. They are 
not concerned with the commercial areas, as our [Singapore's] record is very 
good for dealing with these matters.8
The ROL has been an instrumental part of Singapore's economic 
development; creating a sound business environment that facilitates 
trade. As James Cotton writes:
The People's Action Party regime recognised early that international business 
would not regard Singapore as a proﬁtable ﬁeld of investment without the 
protections for contracts, property and labour controls that were to be found 
in the system of law, which had been bequeathed to the island by the British. 
The government was careful, accordingly, to retain those elements of the 
system, which fulﬁlled signiﬁcant commercial purposes. (Cotton 1999: 17)
The effectiveness of the ROL in sustaining investor conﬁdence in Sin-
gapore was evident during the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997. The crisis, 
which crippled the once formidable 'Tiger economies', was caused by 
economic mismanagement which occurred in the absence of adequate 
legal standards and endemic corruption (Dibb et al. 1998: 9). The hard 
lesson learnt was that 'economic globalisation was feeding the Rule of 
Law imperative by putting pressure on governments to offer stability, 
transparency and accountability that international investors demand' 
(Carothers 1998: 98). In comparison with her neighbours, Singapore 
remained relatively unscathed. While massive withdrawals of foreign 
capital occurred throughout the Southeast Asian region, Singapore was 
able to retain the majority of its foreign investments (Pillbeam: 2001: 125). 
This was due to investor-friendly policies, which included a reliable set 
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of laws that investors could depend upon to protect their investments. 
Singapore's economy continues to be robust, as it has maintained 'a com-
mercial and economic framework that is designed to provide economic 
freedom so that Singapore can compete at the highest levels within the 
global economic and trading system' (Worthington 2003: 104). The con-
tinued economic success of Singapore has in turn contributed positively 
to the PAP's political legitimacy (Ganesan 1998: 589).
The Singapore government has also utilized the ROL as 'a social, politi-
cal and cultural legal framework that is designed to provide maximum 
control over society to enforce social and ethnic harmony, minimise 
sources of political opposition and dissent and impose a conservative 
framework' (Worthington 2003: 104). In terms of social control, misde-
meanours such as spitting, chewing gum, littering, and failing to ﬂush 
toilets, are regarded as crimes by the state and hence, are subjected to 
heavy penalties.9 Media control is enforced through the Newspaper 
and Printing Presses Act, and the Undesirable Publications Act, which 
prohibit publications that the government deems harmful to the public 
and political interest (Tay 2000: 175). The Public Entertainment Act is 
used to regulate public performances to ensure that government-deﬁned 
moral and political standards of propriety are not breached. In the era 
of information technology, the Internet has not escaped state policing. 
This is achieved through the Singapore Broadcasting Authority Act 
and the Computer Misuse Act (Gomez 2002: 33-48). In its attempts to 
discourage political opposition, the PAP has used civil defamation suits 
against its political opponents. Members of opposition parties, as well 
as foreign journalists, have been taken to court over statements or arti-
cles that have allegedly besmirched the reputation of cabinet ministers 
(Worthington 2003: 140; Seow 1997).
The Internal Security Act 
The Internal Security Act is Singapore's foremost national security leg-
islation. The ISA empowers the Internal Security Department (ISD) to 
deal with security threats, such as espionage, subversion and terrorism, 
but also activities that have been classiﬁed as threats by the Singapore 
government (Rodan 1993: 91-96). The main prescription of the ISA is 
detention without trial or preventive detention. A person may be sub-
ject to preventive detention if it is believed that he/she poses a security 
threat or that his/her detention can facilitate investigations. 
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Although the authority to order preventive detention is vested in the 
president of Singapore as head of the executive, the decision to order 
preventive detention is made collectively by the cabinet. Section 8 (a) 
of the ISA states: 
If the President is satisﬁed with respect to any person that, with a view to pre-
venting that person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of 
Singapore or any part thereof or to the maintenance of public order or essential 
services therein, it is necessary to do so, the Minister shall make an order — 
(a) directing that such person be detained for any period not exceeding two 
years 
At the enforcement level, Section 74 (1) of the ISA allows:  
Any police officer may without warrant arrest and detain pending 
enquiries any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe — 
(a) That there are grounds which would justify his detention under section 8:
and
(b) That he has acted or is about to act or is likely to act in any manner preju-
dicial to the security of Singapore or any part thereof.
The initial detention period can be extended to 28 days following a 
maximum 48-hour limit if 'an ofﬁcer of or above the rank of superin-
tendent of police' believes it is necessary.10 Thus, the total time spent in 
detention pending investigations may last up to 30 days. 
As decisions to order preventive detention and make arrests are 
based on the president's 'satisfaction' and a police ofﬁcer's 'reason to 
believe', there is a high degree of subjectivity in the decision-making 
process. The courts have in the past allowed such subjectivity in light of 
the necessity for the executive to move quickly against security threats 
(Tan 1987:247). Moreover, the courts have held that as the cabinet bases 
its decisions on the advice of the minister of home affairs, who in turn 
is advised by the ISD, decisions to order preventive detention are not 
based on personal considerations but on substantiated facts (Rawlings 
1983:337).11 As a result, the judiciary prior to 1989 was reluctant to 
conduct reviews of cases that involved the ISA. This effectively made 
preventive detention, as Tan Yock-Lin observes, tantamount to 'execu-
tive detention' (Tan 1987: 238).
The judiciary's ability to exercise its powers of review of ISA-related 
cases was repealed by the Singapore government in the late 1980s. The 
ISA and all matters pertaining to national security, including the abil-
ity to deﬁne national security threats, enact national security laws, and 
enforce such laws, have now become the exclusive responsibility of the 
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executive, which is dominated by the PAP.12 The ISA can thus be said 
to function as the legislative instrument that binds Singapore's national 
security to the survival of the PAP regime. And not surprisingly, the 
wide powers granted to the executive through the ISA have been jeal-
ously guarded ever since (Tan 2004: 71; Hor 2002: 42).
According to Article 149 of the Singapore Constitution, the ISA should 
not be interpreted as a normal Act of Parliament. Measures set out in 
the Act to deal with offences prejudicial to national security, such as 
preventive detention, supersede considerations of fundamental liberties 
guaranteed by the Constitution under Sections 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14.13 
There are nonetheless safeguards set out in Section 9 (18) of the ISA and 
Section 151 of the Constitution that allow a detainee to obtain recourse 
against wrongful detention and to be protected against ill-treatment 
during incarceration (Amnesty International 1988). 
Briefly, a detainee may engage legal counsel to appeal his/her 
detention to an advisory board. The board considers the representations 
and is free to make further investigations to assist in its deliberations. The 
board's recommendation to either continue with or cease the detention 
is made to the president of Singapore. The board's recommendation is 
only implemented if the president concurs. Should detention continue, 
the board is required to undertake an annual review of the case and 
make further recommendations. 
To prevent the physical assault of detainees, a doctor is present 
before and after each interview session to examine the detainee. The 
examinations are recorded and complaints of the detainee are noted 
on his/her medical sheet. Discoveries of physical abuse are reported 
and investigations are subsequently carried out. Furthermore, a Board 
of Inspection may be convened to make unscheduled inspections to 
ascertain the well-being of detainees. The existence of these safeguards 
has not placated civil society groups, opposition parties, former 
detainees and human rights groups, which have vociferously argued 
that the ISA should be abolished as it is susceptible to political misuse 
(South China Morning Post 1998; Agence France-Presse 2000). 
Misuse of National Security Legislation 
In Asia, the ROL functions as an instrument of governance that enables 
state actors to pursue political objectives, such as facilitating economic 
development, exercising social control and enhancing national security 
(Jayasuriya 1999: 13). National security in Asia is framed within the 
context of political stability, economic development and social welfare 
36 ___________________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 23•2006
Damien Cheong  ____________________________________________________________
(Harris and Mack 1997: 3-4). As a consequence, Asian governments have 
been able to justify their use of the ROL to ensure social, commercial 
and political order, which, they argue, is tantamount to ensuring the 
security of the state. For example, the Asian Legal Resource Centre 
(ALRC) has observed that:
'National security' has been incorporated within national legal frameworks. 
Although known by different names, 'emergency' acts have deliberately 
incorporated a common ﬂaw: vital concepts such as 'terrorism', 'subversion', 
'state/public security', have not been clearly deﬁned to describe the precise 
nature of the perceived threat. It is this ambiguity that has given govern-
ments wide scope in exercising such legislation, whether or not within an 
emergency situation, and thereby protect themselves from public scrutiny 
and criticism. In this militarized scenario, popular dissent is stiﬂed and con-
demned as 'subversion'. The 'enemy' is among and within the population 
and consequently the people themselves are perceived to be a threat.14 
In the Singaporean context, the city-state's national security paradigm 
similarly intertwines economics, law and order, and regime survival 
(Thio 2004: 185). As the demarcations are usually blurred, the govern-
ment's use of national security measures, and in particular, the ISA, has 
resulted in accusations of misuse. Critics have argued that the ISA has 
been used not to contain actual security threats, but instead to suppress 
political dissent and opposition (The Straits Times [hereafter ST] 1999b). 
The Singapore government has strongly defended itself against these 
allegations, reiterating that its use of the ISA is governed by preventive 
and not punitive considerations (Agence France-Presse 2002b). However, 
as long as Singapore's national security paradigm is couched in terms 
of regime survival, the controversy over the government's use of the 
ISA will remain. 
The Evolution of the ISA from Security Measure  
to Political Instrument 
The Emergency Regulations, from which the ISA is derived, were 
enacted in 1948 by the British colonial administration to deal with the 
communist insurgents that threatened the state. However, since the 
end of the Malayan Emergency in 1960, the successive governments 
of Singapore have not made any attempts to abolish the ISA. Instead, 
they have sought to incorporate the ISA into the legislative framework, 
thereby ensuring the retention of 'exceptional and executive prerogative 
power' (Jayasuriya 2001: 93). The ability to exercise such powers has 
enabled the Singapore government to use the ISA to contain political 
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threats, which it perceives as national security threats. This evolution 
is linked to Singapore's historical development.
The Emergency Regulations
 Although the Malayan communists fought alongside the British against 
the Japanese in the Second World War, their political objectives after the 
war put them on a collision course with the British colonial administra-
tion. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) revived its plans to supplant 
the British administration and establish a Malayan People's Republic 
(Pillai 1976: 592; Turnbull 1989: 225). The MCP's initial strategy was 
to mobilize the trade unions, but when these attempts proved futile, a 
strategy of armed struggle was advocated (Pillai 1976: 591; Chin 1995: 
28). The armed struggle aimed to disrupt the economy, drive the Brit-
ish forces to vulnerable strategic positions, and 'liberate' geographic 
areas from British control (Pillai 1976: 592). MCP guerrillas attacked 
remote police posts, plantations, railway lines, and even succeeded in 
assassinating the high commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, in 1951 (Pillai 
1976: 592-95).
In this time of crisis, the high commissioner was granted extraordinary 
powers to defend the colony and move against the insurgents (Lee 2002: 
56; Ministry of Home Affairs 2002: 17). The Emergency Regulations, 
which were enacted as a result, enabled the authorities to use preventive 
detention, impose curfews and restrict publications for the purpose of 
eliminating the communist threat (Lee 2002: 57). The British also con-
ducted mass arrests, carried out deportations, expanded their security 
apparatuses, and destroyed the homes of communist sympathizers 
(Hack 1999: 102). The adoption of such draconian counter-insurgency 
measures, coupled with an effective propaganda campaign, resulted in 
a reduction of communist attacks (Hack 1999: 123-25).  
The Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (PPSO) (1955)
The demands for an independent Singapore, which had been delayed 
as a result of the Malayan Emergency, were revived in the 1950s. The 
Labour Front (LF) under David Marshall scored an impressive victory 
in the 1955 elections, and became the ﬁrst local government in the post-
colonial era. The People's Action Party (PAP), which was formed in 
1954, was elected into opposition. The PAP had formed an alliance with 
two prominent communist trade unionists, Lim Chin Siong and Fong 
Swee Suan, in order to increase the party's appeal to the broader Chi-
nese-educated electorate (Mauzy and Milne 2002: 39). The communist 
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alliance proved extremely risky. The PAP was not only held responsible 
for communist ﬁrebrands who preached and mobilized violent civil 
disobedience campaigns, but the party itself was also in danger of suc-
cumbing to a communist takeover (Fong 1979: 38; Yee et al. 1989: 70). 
From 1954 to 1956 a series of riots erupted throughout Singapore, which 
compelled the Labour Front government to act.
The Preservation of Public Security Ordinance (PPSO) was enacted 
in 1955 to replace the Emergency Regulations (Yee et al. 1989: 70). And 
although David Marshall had misgivings about retaining the Ordinance, 
he acknowledged that the PPSO would be instrumental in curbing the 
disruptive activities of the communists (Drysdale 1984: 115; Yee et al. 
1989: 71). Although Marshall had the PPSO at his disposal, he dem-
onstrated a reluctance to use the ordinance to quell the unrests and 
apprehend the ringleaders. This angered the British, who had grown 
increasingly impatient with Marshall's inability to restore law and order. 
Marshall resigned in 1956 and was succeeded by Lim Yew Hock. 
Lim was not averse to utilizing the draconian measures granted by 
the PPSO, to purge the unions of communist inﬂuence. In October 1956, 
a student sit-in escalated into widespread rioting. The Lim Yew Hock 
government summarily carried out island-wide raids of union and MCP 
headquarters, and detained many people under the PPSO, including the 
communist leaders of the PAP. The PAP detainees included Devan Nair 
(the former president of Singapore but then adviser to the STC Employ-
ees Union), Lim Chin Siong, Fong Swee Suan, Sandra Woodhull, Chan 
Chiaw Thor and James Puthucheary (Drysdale 1984: 157; Fong 1979: 
50). The government conducted a similar purge of communist leaders 
in August 1957, which resulted in the arrest of 11 pro-communist PAP 
members (Fong 1979: 60-61).
The reduction of communist leaders in the PAP coupled with the loss 
of the LF's political legitimacy resulted in the election victory of the PAP 
in 1959 (Mauzy and Milne 2002: 16). The PAP's ﬁrst act was to secure 
the release of all political detainees before it was ofﬁcially sworn in on 
5 June 1959 (Drysdale 1984: 221-25; Fong 1979: 77-79).
The Internal Security Act of Malaysia (1960)
Following the end of the Malayan Emergency in July 1960, the PAP lead-
ership began to lobby for Singapore to enter into a federation with Malay-
sia. This was because Malaysia could provide the much-needed security, 
economic and political opportunities that would ensure Singapore's 
survival (Mutalib 2003: 59). On 27 May 1961, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the 
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prime minister of Malaya, suggested the establishment of a federation 
comprising Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo states. Lee Kuan Yew and 
the moderate PAP leadership expressed genuine interest over the Tunku's 
proposal, but were challenged by the communist wing of the party, led 
by Lim Chin Siong. The communists were eventually dismissed from the 
PAP and established the Barisan Socialis party on 13 August 1961 (Fong 
1979: 101). As the Barisan Sosialis became increasingly antagonistic in 
their orientation, their participation in the Malayan / Singapore political 
arenas became a cause for concern (Drysdale 1984: 314). Although the 
Special Branch compiled dossiers on political leaders who were regarded 
as potential threats, the British, Malayan and Singapore representatives 
of the Internal Security Council could not reach a consensus on who to 
detain (Drysdale 1984: 314). The disagreement stemmed from an inherent 
difﬁculty in distinguishing between those leaders that posed a genuine 
security risk and those who were deemed political threats. An armed 
uprising in Brunei on 8 December 1962 convinced the Internal Security 
Council to move against the Barisan Sosialis.
On the 2 February 1963, 'Operation Coldstore' was launched. The Spe-
cial Branch conducted raids on Barisan Sosialis headquarters, the Rakyat 
party and Singapore Association of Trade Unions (SATU) premises, 
and other 'open-front communist organizations' (Abisheganaden 1963). 
Approximately 107 politicians and trade unionists, including Lim Chin 
Siong, were detained under the Internal Security Act of Malaysia (which 
had replaced the PPSO in 1960), to prevent 'subversives from establish-
ing a communist Cuba in Singapore and mounting violence' prior to 
Federation (Abisheganaden 1963). With the Barisan Sosialis severely 
weakened by the arrests and detentions of its leaders, the plans for the 
inclusion of Singapore in the Federation of Malaysia proceeded (Turn-
bull 1989: 274). On the 31 August 1963, Singapore became part of the 
newly established Federation of Malaysia.
Singapore obtained her independence from Malaysia on 9 August 1965. 
The Barisan Sosialis was still active in Singapore politics but seemed to be 
facing an internecine crisis. In a dramatic move that signalled the change 
in strategy of the Barisan Sosialis, all its nine members of parliament 
resigned in October 1966. The party leader, Chia Thye Poh, announced 
that the Barisan Sosialis would be taking their struggle outside parliament 
where protests, strikes and demonstrations could be expected (Mutalib 
2003: 106). The PAP, now ﬁrmly entrenched in government, perceived 
that the activities of the Barisan Sosialis posed a threat to stability. 
Moreover, skirmishes between police and Barisan supporters at a rally 
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in aid of Vietnam, convinced the government that the Barisan had to be 
stopped. On the 28 October 1966, 30 Barisan Sosialis cadres and unionists 
were arrested and detained under the ISA (Sam 1966b). Chia Thye Poh 
was among those arrested as the government opined it was 'necessary 
to arrest and detain the principal culprits involved in the planning and 
execution of these illegal activities to impress upon Barisan Sosialis lead-
ers and other Communist United front operators that resort to violence 
will not advance their cause' (Sam 1966a; The Sunday Times 1966). Chia 
Thye Poh remained incarcerated under the ISA for 23 years, excluding 
the eight years he spent under house arrest (Amnesty International 1998; 
ST 1998). Chia was not released earlier because he had refused to recant 
communism or violence, which he maintains he never advocated in the 
ﬁrst place (South China Morning Post 1998).
The Internal Security Act (1970)
In 1970, the ISA of Malaysia was incorporated into Singapore's legislative 
framework as the Internal Security Act of Singapore (Yee et al. 1989: 70). 
The Singapore government continued to use the ISA in its campaign to 
eliminate alleged communist subversives and other potential threats. 
During the 1970s, the government used the ISA to detain journalists, 
lawyers, university lecturers and students whom it suspected of having 
communist inclinations (see Appendix 1). Notable detainees included 
G. Rahman, Arun Senkuttuvan and Ho Kwon Ping (Lee 1978: 231-34). 
The government believed that preventive detention and a strong inter-
nal security force were a necessity against insidious communist threats 
(Goh 1967: 53-54).
In the 1980s, the Singapore government claimed that a more insidious 
form of communist subversion had been detected. In addition, com-
munalism had seemingly emerged as a potential threat to the social 
fabric of the city-state. Both threats were regarded as serious enough 
for the government to employ the ISA to detain the suspects.15 Four 
Malays were detained on 24 April 1987 for spreading false rumours of 
an impending race riot (ST 1987d). On the 27 May 1987, the Ministry of 
Home Affairs revealed that a plot had been uncovered to 'overthrow 
the Government and establish a communist state' (ST 1987c). Sixteen 
people were initially arrested, and another six were arrested in subse-
quent raids. Of those detained, four were full-time social workers of the 
Catholic Church, six were volunteer workers with the Geylang Catholic 
Centre for Foreign Workers, four were part of the Third Stage drama 
group, and two were members of the Workers' Party Editorial Com-
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mittee. The alleged mastermind was Tan Wah Piow, a former student 
union activist who was pursuing a law degree in the UK. According 
to authorities, Tan had collaborated with Vincent Cheng, a volunteer 
worker, to inﬁltrate student unions and Catholic groups and to use these 
organizations as a platform for political agitation. As all the detainees 
were English-educated professionals, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
claimed that Singapore had to 'contend with new hybrid pro-communist 
types who draw their ideological inspiration not only from Maoism and 
Marxism-Leninism, but also from the ideas of contemporary militant 
leftists in the West' (ST 1987c).
In September 1987, four of the alleged Marxist conspirators were 
released from preventive detention. Together with ﬁve other former 
detainees, they issued a joint statement protesting their innocence in 
April 1988. Their release orders were summarily revoked and they 
were re-arrested on the grounds that they continued to pose a security 
risk. The detainees then lodged an appeal under habeas corpus to chal-
lenge the validity of their re-arrests and detention. The Court of Appeal 
found that the minister of home affairs had not demonstrated sufﬁcient 
grounds to order the re-arrests, and thus, issued a judgment in favour 
of the detainees. In doing so, the Court of Appeal demonstrated that 
it was willing to challenge the executive on national security matters. 
The government reacted swiftly by amending both the Constitution and 
the ISA to exclude judicial review on decisions relating to preventive 
detentions under the ISA.
Despite the government's claims of a 'Marxist conspiracy', and the 
detainees' public confessions, many Singaporeans were unconvinced 
that the detainees posed a real security risk. Furthermore, accounts of ill-
treatment of the detainees during interrogation and detention provoked 
international outrage, which tarnished Singapore's global image (Mitton 
1993: 46). Many observers came to the conclusion that the arrests were 
in fact politically motivated (Haas 1989: 48-77). For instance, former 
Singapore Solicitor-General Francis Seow opined that: 
The plain unvarnished truth was that the prime minister had marked this 
group of sixteen young professionals, augmented by the later arrests of an-
other six persons, for retributive action because of their effective assistance to 
opposition MP J. B. Jeyaretnam and the Workers' Party in snatching victory 
in the 1981 by-election and the 1984 general election. (Seow 1994: 79)
In 1988, Francis Seow was himself detained for 72 days under the ISA 
(Seow 1994). The government alleged that Seow had colluded with an 
American diplomat to contest the forthcoming elections, and it regarded 
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this act as interference in the domestic affairs of Singapore (ST 1988). 
The diplomat was formally expelled, while Seow was detained by the 
ISD for questioning. A rumour surfaced that Seow was incarcerated to 
prevent him from taking part in the 1988 general elections. However, his 
release and consequent participation in the elections did not dispel the 
perception that the ISA had once again been used for political purposes. 
As T. J. S. George, former political editor with the Far Eastern Economic 
Review, remarked:
Indeed, the colonialists had administered the Act [ISA] … with a degree 
of grace; detainees were released after a decent period of time and often 
brought to trial under the due process of law. Under Lee [Lee Kuan Yew], 
the grace disappeared. He consolidated the Act and made it the permanent 
base of political life in Singapore. If a Gandhi had arisen to lead a popular 
civil disobedience movement against the Lee government in Singapore, 
he would have found the Asian premier a harsher overlord than faraway 
Westminster, and he would simply have disappeared behind the high walls 
of Changi Prison. (George 1984: 116-17)
During the 1990s, the Singapore government used the ISA to detain 
six people suspected of espionage. Although details are vague, the 1997 
arrest involved a female civil servant who was caught forwarding clas-
siﬁed documents to an agent of a foreign intelligence agency (ST 1999a; 
Ministry of Home Affairs 2002: 11). In 1998, four Singaporeans were 
arrested for gathering information on behalf of a foreign intelligence 
agency (ST 1999a; Ministry of Home Affairs 2002: 11).
The government's increasing use of the ISA to combat political threats 
in the name of security had a profound impact on Singapore society, 
and in particular, on political and civil society groups (Tremewan 1994: 
209). As the government's level of tolerance towards political dissent 
was not always clear, prudence dictated that criticism of the government 
had to be done tacitly or not at all. As the Singapore electorate grew 
more sophisticated, the constant practice of 'self-censorship' became 
common (Gomez 2000). As a result, some dissenters chose to launch 
their protests from overseas, while others opted to stay in Singapore 
and operate within the OB ('out-of-bound') markers that delineated the 
level of political participation accepted by the Singapore government 
(Lee 2002: 108-10; Rerceretnam 2006). The Singapore government found 
it increasingly difﬁcult to justify the retention of the ISA, but that did 
not imply that it was prepared to abolish the Act (ST 1999b). Notwith-
standing, the events of September 11 and the resulting global War on 
Terrorism have precipitated a refocus on the ISA as a law that defends 
the state against national security threats.
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The ISA as Anti-Terrorism Legislation and a Return to 
Security
In December 2001 and August 2002, the Internal Security Department 
(ISD) arrested and detained 37 people in connection with terrorist activi-
ties (Ministry of Home Affairs 2003; Nirmala 2004). Most of the detainees 
belonged to the Singapore branch of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network. 
According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the JI's prime objective was to 
create a Pan-Islamic state in the region through the use of armed struggle. 
The JI had forged links with other Southeast Asian and international mili-
tant groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Osama 
Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda in order to pool and share resources (Ministry of 
Home Affairs 2003). As such, the JI was able to tap the expertise of its 
more experienced counterparts to conduct training programmes, procure 
weapons and obtain ﬁnance (Abuza 2002: 428). In order to evade detec-
tion, the JI established small cells with speciﬁc responsibilities in Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Singapore (Ministry of Home Affairs 2003: 
6-9). The Singapore cell was set up as an operational unit that was tasked 
with planning and co-ordinating attacks against Western, and in particular 
American targets in Singapore (Abuza 2002: 456-57). Investigations re-
vealed that the cell was planning to attack the US embassy, naval vessels, 
schools, commercial buildings and the Yishun substation (the substation 
is frequented by many US armed forces personnel) (Ministry of Home 
Affairs 2003: 11-14). It was also discovered that the cell was planning to 
attack local targets, such as the Singapore–Malaysia water pipeline, the 
Changi international airport, the Ministry of Defence and other civilian 
establishments (Ministry of Home Affairs 2003: 30-31).
Following the JI arrests and ongoing efforts to cripple the JI network, 
local politicians and academics predicted that the threat to Singapore 
from terrorism would remain unabated for many years (Latif 2002; Singh 
2002: 6; Wong 2004). This was because the terrorist organizations in the 
region were not only highly resilient, but also because Singapore was 
closely aligned with the United States (Reuters 2002). In view of this, 
Singapore's leader advocated a policy of constant vigilance against 
potential security threats (Ramesh 2004; Ahmad 2004). Such terrorist 
threat assessments were given credibility in the wake of the JI attacks 
in Indonesia on two Bali nightclubs (2002), the Marriott hotel in Jakarta 
(2003), the Australian Embassy (2004), and a Bali shopping strip (2005) 
(Agence France-Presse 2002c; Wroe 2003; Mapes et al. 2004; Ramakrishna 
2004: 54; Quijano et al. 2005).
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Constant threat assessments, the JI attacks in neighbouring Indonesia, 
added security measures, and increased government spending on de-
fence, have collectively contributed to the 'climate of fear' that has tacitly 
pervaded the city-state (Chia 2002; Ho and Pardesi 2004; Lee 2004). It is 
in this context that the justiﬁcation for retaining the ISA, as an integral 
part of Singapore's defence strategy against terrorism, was successfully 
achieved. By empowering the ISD to pre-emptively move against the 
local JI cell, the ISA was deemed to have indirectly prevented the per-
petration of the planned attacks.16 To further strengthen its arguments 
for retaining the ISA, the Singapore government undertook a promotion 
campaign designed to recast the ISA as a vital tool to combat terrorism 
(Rodan and Hewison 2004: 13).
Recasting the ISA
Direct Promotion of the ISA and ISD
The ISA and the ISD have in the past always evoked a sense of appre-
hension. Indeﬁnite detention, maltreatment, physical and mental abuse, 
and public humiliation were common images associated with the law 
as well as the department (Tremewan 1994: 202). In an effort to dispel 
such negative perceptions, the Ministry of Home Affairs launched a 
series of public awareness campaigns, beginning with the publication 
of two documents that provided detailed information on the JI arrests, 
the ISA and the ISD (Agence France-Presse 2002a; ST 2002b). The publica-
tions were also complemented with other initiatives that were designed 
to raise the proﬁle of the ISD. This resulted in a partial removal of the 
'veil of secrecy' that had surrounded the inner workings of the depart-
ment since its establishment (ST 2000). For instance, the ISD Heritage 
Centre was set up to 'showcase the operational history of the depart-
ment', and although the Centre was a designated training facility for 
ISD ofﬁcers, members of the public were allowed to view the displays 
and exhibits.17 A mobile version of the Heritage Centre exhibits also 
toured schools and community centres (Koh 2003). ISD ofﬁcers were 
present at the exhibitions to respond to public queries. Also, ISD ofﬁcer 
promotion ceremonies, that had in the past been conducted internally, 
were celebrated in public venues such as hotels (ST 2002b).
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Indirectly Promoting the ISA: The Economic Dimension
As Singapore's economic growth and development have always been 
'couched in terms of survival and security', the economic dimension of 
the 'War on Terrorism' enabled the government to indirectly promote 
the ISA (Tan 2004: 72). Linking terrorism, and in particular the JI arrests, 
to the economy in a 'trade–security nexus', was a recurrent theme in 
many ministerial speeches (Rodan and Hewison 2004: 9). For instance, 
former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, noted: 
The JI episode is a threat to our economy. Foreign investors might become 
worried about the safety of their investments. And if Changi Airport and 
Jurong Island had been attacked, that would have done actual harm to our 
economic interests. If foreign investors keep away from Singapore, there 
would be fewer jobs for Singaporeans. Our livelihood would be affected.18 
Implicit in such statements was the necessity for the Singapore govern-
ment to maintain order and political stability through the ISA, in order 
to ensure the sustainability of Singapore's economy (Tan 2004: 72). This 
argument was validated with the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement 
between Singapore and the United States in 2002, which had resulted 
from Singapore's assistance to US anti-terrorism efforts.
The US–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) was perceived 
as a reward for the city-state's unequivocal support for the US in the 
'old' and 'new' security environments (Mitton 2003). The Republic had 
in the past granted the US access to military facilities, was fervently 
supportive of the US-led war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and was instru-
mental in preventing the JI attack on American interests (Rodan and 
Hewison 2004: 10-11). In light of these actions, US Congressmen Pete 
Sessions afﬁrmed: 'Singapore supported us not only on the day of the 
terrorist attacks, but has since been very involved in our war on terror 
… Countries which are our friends are those who will continue to reap 
the rewards of a closer relationship.'19
The advantages to Singapore stemming from the USSFTA were both 
economic and strategic (Koh, Y. 2003: 3). In economic terms, the USSFTA 
would reduce the initial amount of Singapore's export tariffs by 92 per 
cent with further reductions made in subsequent years. All impedi-
ments to e-commerce would be removed and service providers would 
be granted access to both federal and state governments (Washington 
2003). The overall proﬁts accruing to Singapore companies from such 
measures were predicted at S$200 million. 
Strategically, the Singapore government was anxious to 'entrench the 
US presence' in the region to ensure the continued security and stabil-
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ity of Southeast Asia (Mitton 2003; Hadar 2002). It was envisaged that 
bilateral co-operation between the two countries would be enhanced in 
terms of 'counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, joint military exercises and training, policy dialogues and 
defence technology' (Acharya 2004).
In short, linking strategic, social and economic beneﬁts to the Sin-
gapore government's 'War on Terror' enabled the PAP to allude to the 
ISA as having indirectly facilitated these beneﬁts. Furthermore the US, 
a once ardent critic of the ISA, had expressed its support for the gov-
ernment's use of the ISA to neutralize the local JI cell (The Sunday Times 
2002). As Richard Boucher, a spokesman for the US State Department, 
noted: 'We're cooperating very closely with the Singaporean authorities. 
We welcome the active engagement that Singapore is taking against 
terrorism, and we've applauded the arrests that they've made in these 
matters” (Channel News Asia 2002). Such support has provided a measure 
of international legitimacy for the government's use of the ISA.
The government's promotional campaigns aimed to recast the ISA 
as anti-terrorism legislation. This was designed to lend credence to the 
government's argument that the ISA was still relevant and should not 
be abolished. As home affairs minister Wong Kan Seng argued:
Some people continue to be critical about the Internal Security Act. But for 
most Singaporeans today, they now know the value of the ISA … without 
the ISA and ISD … they would not have enjoyed this sense of safety and 
security today ... [I]t is because of the Home Team that Singaporeans can 
sleep well at night, in the comfort that there are thousands of Home Team 
ofﬁcers keeping watch for them.20
Some opposition politicians even recanted their former objections to 
the PAP's use of the ISA. For example, Chiam See Tong of the Singapore 
Democratic Alliance (SDA), noted: 
My party, the Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA), welcomes the Gov-
ernment's decision to introduce the White Paper on the JI detentions. The 
White Paper provides the factual background to the detentions and show 
how appropriate the Internal Security Act is in dealing with threats to na-
tional security.21
Human rights advocates and other opposition parties though remain 
sceptical about the government's use of the ISA, since the PAP's concep-
tion of national security does include an element of self-preservation 
(Agence France-Presse 2004). 
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The Inherent Limitations of the ISA
The new security environment has enabled the Singapore government 
to recast the ISA as an integral tool to defend the state against terrorist 
and other national security threats. The ISA has seemingly obtained 
a new lease of life and gained international and domestic legitimacy 
through the government's use of the Act to detain the JI operatives. 
Notwithstanding, the inherent limitations of the ISA suggest that the 
Act remains susceptible to misuse.
The fundamental ﬂaw of the ISA is that it does not contain a clear 
deﬁnition of a national security threat (Chua 2004: 84). The Singapore 
government has defended the Act as 'a critical legal instrument of last 
resort to counter security threats such as racial and religious extrem-
ism, espionage, terrorism and subversion' and is 'not used to suppress 
political opposition but to counter extremist groups or radical groups 
that threaten Singapore's internal security or do harm to our people'.22 
However, with the exception of terrorism (deﬁned in the United Nations 
(Anti-terrorism Measures) Regulations 2001), other forms of national 
security threats have not been explicitly deﬁned either within the ISA 
or in accompanying regulations/legislation. As threats to national se-
curity remain in deﬁnitional ambiguity, the responsibility for deﬁning 
such threats remains the responsibility of the executive. This allows 
the executive to interpret certain types of political dissent as national 
security threats, which could result in the detention of the activists. As 
the ISA is Singapore's foremost national security legislation, and since 
national security is intimately connected to the political legitimacy of 
the regime, the ISA invariably becomes a law that protects the PAP 
from political attack.
As the safeguard of judicial review on executive decisions to order 
preventive detention has been absent since 1989, this removes any 
legislative recourse for individuals who may have been wrongfully 
detained.23 And although the Advisory Board Review exists to prevent 
wrongful detention, the process itself has limitations. For example, the 
Board cannot secure a detainee's release without the consent of the 
president and the cabinet. 
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Conclusion 
The ISA has been transformed from a security law into an effective 
political instrument of the Singapore government. As Hugh Hickling, 
who drafted the ISA in 1960, observes: 
Since I drafted the original Act, the ISA has been tightened up and tightened 
up until now there's no provision for judicial review. Unfortunately over the 
years the powers have been abused. Instead of locking up people suspected 
of organizing violence, which is the phrase used in the permeable to the ISA, 
it's been used to lock up political opponents, quite harmless people.24 
Although the government's use of the ISA for political purposes elic-
ited negative reactions from the public, it was not prepared to abolish, 
or make amendments to the Act (ST 1999b). In the wake of September 
11 and the international campaign against terrorism, the opportunity 
to (re)legitimize the government's use of the ISA arose. As the ISA had 
been instrumental in preventing several terrorist attacks on domestic 
and foreign targets by empowering the ISD to move quickly against the 
organizers, the ISA has been heralded as an effective piece of anti-ter-
rorism legislation. The government's recent use of the ISA also gained 
international and domestic validity, which further strengthened their 
resolve to retain the ISA. Despite the support for the government's use 
of the ISA, human rights advocates continue to voice their opposition 
to the ISA.
While the issue of human rights concerns used to dominate any dis-
cussion regarding the ISA, the new security environment has effectively 
weakened their impact. The spectre of international terrorism has vindi-
cated the use of harsh national security legislation by governments, and 
drowned out demands for such legislation to be abolished based solely 
on human rights or civil libertarian concerns (De Castro 2005: 229). It 
cannot be expected that non-democratic governments would have any 
incentive to abolish national security laws, since liberal democracies 
have themselves enacted anti-terrorism legislation that contravenes 
human rights in some way. Hence, it is clear that draconian anti-ter-
rorism laws will be a feature of both Western democracies and neo-au-
thoritarian Asian states in the foreseeable future. If so, then the current 
strategy of human rights advocates, that is, to strenuously demand the 
abolition of anti-terrorism legislation, will be a futile gesture. In light 
of these circumstances, it may be prudent for human rights advocates 
to amend their strategies accordingly or risk being labelled as terrorist 
sympathizers.25
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In Singapore, human rights and civil libertarian concerns do not reso-
nate as loudly as in the West. Singaporeans are however intimidated by 
the threat of indeﬁnite incarceration and ill-treatment, and have concerns 
that national security threats will adversely affect their ﬁnancial stand-
ing. This has deterred many from engaging actively in political debates 
for fear of incurring the wrath of the government; it has also resulted in 
expressions of support for the government's use of the ISA against the 
local JI cell. This does not imply that the younger generation of Singa-
poreans who are highly educated and more exposed to international 
trends are politically apathetic or are content with the limited level of 
political participation. There is a genuine eagerness to participate more 
actively in politics and a desire to express their criticisms of government 
policies without fear of being detained under the ISA.
The Singapore government has arguably made subtle changes in its 
policies regarding the ISA. The differences in treatment of the ISA de-
tainees in 2001/2002 and 1987 are a case in point. This is however, not 
to naïvely suggest that a fair degree of 'psychological pressure' 26 was 
not applied during the interrogation of the JI detainees. Rather I simply 
wish to highlight that the government does realize that it cannot simply 
'lock people up indeﬁnitely' without experiencing a backlash. Neverthe-
less, the ISA and the ISD will remain part of the political landscape in 
Singapore for the foreseeable future. 
Damien Cheong is a PhD Candidate at the School of Social and Political Inquiry, 
Monash University, Australia
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NOTES
1  S 412 USA Patriot Act – Amendment to S 236 of The Immigration and Nationality Act, 
S 236A (a)(3).
2  S 412 USA Patriot Act – Amendment to S 236 of The Immigration and Nationality Act, 
S 236A (a)(2); S 412 USA Patriot Act – Amendment to S 236 of The Immigration and 
Nationality Act, S 236A (a)(6).
3  A writ of habeas corpus is a judicial mandate to a prison ofﬁcial ordering that an 
inmate be brought to the court so it can be determined whether or not that person 
is imprisoned lawfully and whether or not he should be released from custody.
4  S 412 USA Patriot Act (b)(2).
5  HARD Talk, British Broadcasting Corporation, 23 September 2003. 
6  Interview with Goh Chok Tong, HARD Talk, British Broadcasting Corporation, 23 
September 2003. 
7  In a Western context, the Rule of Law exists as a framework for governance, whereas 
in an Asian context, it exists as an instrument of governance. 
8  Kevin Tan, cited in Chua Mui Hoong, 'Is Singapore's Legal System Getting a Bad 
Name?'. The Straits Times, 25 October 1997.
9  This has given rise to the characterization of Singapore as a 'ﬁne-city'.
10  S.74 (3) (4) ISA. 
11  It is assumed that the evidentiary materials, supplied by the investigating department 
(the Internal Security Department [ISD]) to the Executive to assist it in its decisions, 
are devoid of personal considerations or unsubstantiated facts. 
12  Article 149 of the Singapore Constitution, S 1 (e).
13  See Article 9: Liberty of a Person, 11: Protection against retrospective criminal laws 
and repeated trials, 12: Equal protection, 13: Prohibition of banishment and freedom 
of movement 14: Freedom of speech, assembly and association.
14  Statement submitted by the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC) to the UN Commis-
sion on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of States 
of Emergency, E/CN.4/2002/NGO/78, (31 January 2002). Accessed 31 October 
2004: http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/ea32e95eddaefad3c12
56b64004199de?Opendocument 
15  Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister's New Year Message, 1988.
16  Wong Kan Seng cited in 'Book on ISA to be released this Year', The Straits Times, 
14 April 2002; 'Priority to Neutralise Terrorist Network Not Try Accused'. Agence 
France-Presse, 29 September 2002.
17  Internal Security Department, 'Security Education', Available: http://www.mha.
gov.sg/isd/se.htm 
18  Opening remarks by Prime Minster Goh Chok Tong at the Dialogue with Commu-
nity Leaders on the Arrest of the Second Group of Jemaah Islamiyah Members, on 
14 October 2002.
19  US Congressman Pete Sessions, cited in Jennifer Lienin Washington, 'Singapore Firms 
Set to Reap S$200m a Year from US Trade Pact'. The Straits Times, 8 May 2003.
20  Speech by Mr Wong Kan Seng, Minister for Home Affairs at the ISD Intelligence 
Service Promotion Ceremony, 3 April 2003.
21  Chiam See Tong, Parliamentary Speech on JI Whitepaper. Accessed 15 August 2005:
  http://www.spp.org.sg/sp200103.html.
22  Vanu Gopala Menon, Letter from the Permanent Representative of Singapore: Question 
of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in any part of the World. Of-
ﬁce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, (19 March 2002). 
Accessed 31 October 2004 http://www.ohchr.org/english/
52 ___________________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 23•2006
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23  S 8B (1) (2), Internal Security Act; S 149 (3), Constitution of the Republic of Singa-
pore.
24  Hugh Hickling, cited in Roger Mitton, 'The Long Story: Keeping the Streets Safe'. 
Asiaweek, 28 July 1993: 46.
25  US Senate, 'Testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft', Department of Justice 
Oversight: Preserving our Freedoms while Defending Against Terrorism, Hearings before 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Congress, 1st Session, 2001. Cited in Nancy 
V. Barker, 'National Security versus Civil Liberties'. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 
September 2003, 33 (3): 547-48.
26  In the Marxist case, the then deputy prime minister, Lee Hsien Loong, admitted: 
'The Government does not ill-treat detainees. It does however apply psychological 
pressure to detainees to get the truth of the matter.' See 'BG Lee Explains Rationale 
for Re-arrests'. The Straits Times, 22 April 1988.
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